An independent research lab working on market design and operations research. We build working systems and use them to study how people and markets respond to incentives.
We study how the rules of a system — how prices form, how forecasts are scored, how commitments are enforced — shape the behavior of the people inside it.
Prediction markets and information aggregation. When do fragmented markets like Kalshi and
Polymarket agree, when do they diverge, and what do persistent price gaps reveal about fees, liquidity, and
who is trading? How should a trader optimally route orders across fragmented venues?
Scoring rules and forecast evaluation. Proper scoring rules make honest reporting a
forecaster's best strategy. How do elicitation mechanisms perform in practice, and how do market prices
compare to scored forecasts as estimates of probability?
Incentive design for voluntary behavior. Commitment devices, streaks, and social
accountability are mechanisms too. Which non-monetary incentives sustain behavior over time?
Working systems we build, deploy, and use as research instruments.
For research collaboration or questions about our work.